By Andrew Anton Mako*
PNG politics was labeled unstable for many years, for
some it’s analogous to the well-known political impasse in 2011.
Today
we’re still experiencing these problems.
The
notion of political “stability” in PNG has often been used by many governments
to increase their political longevity in Parliament, and to quash any attempts
of change in government. This is a narrow definition of political stability,
which was described as elusive at best and been “achieved” in many ways, that undermined
parliamentary democracy, and lessened the power of the Parliament or the
Legislature over the years.
Constant
change in government is disruptive to socio-economic development and should not
be encouraged. However, in PNG the Executive Government’s practice of amassing
power, particularly in the last decade, at the expense of the Legislature, the
second arm of government, is in itself undemocratic, and impedes the separation
of power between these two arms of government.
Since
1977, PNG has had only coalition governments – small parties coming together to
join a party which had won many more seats (although on average less than 30
percent of total seats contested across PNG) than the other parties. Successive
coalition governments have been fragile and, until the last decade, haven’t
lived out their full terms of five years in Parliament. In the PNG Parliament,
the balance of power that ultimately determines the lifespan of a government
lies with the middle and backbenches of the Parliament. This is where
“unattached” Members of Parliament (MPs) are seated. By “unattached” I mean those
MPs who either aren’t in government, or at least not occupying portfolios in
the government. They aren’t important powerbrokers in the coalition.
History
shows that ensuring the support of the middle and backbenchers has been an
important goal of any government. If a coalition government can successfully “shut
out” the middle and backbenchers of the Parliament, it can ably last a full
term of five years. This was brought to the fore in the last decade under Prime
Minister (PM) Somare’s two terms of government.
How
did the previous governments control the middle and backbenchers?
Formal
attempts were made by the Executive Government during the early 2000 to bring
stability into Parliament – in the context of this article - to “control” the
middle and backbenchers. The government headed by then PM Sir Mekere Morauta enacted
the Organic Law on Integrity of Political Parties & Candidates (OLIGPAC) in
2000 which required that all MPs voted along party lines, including in an event
of a change in government. For a decade, the OLIGPAC successfully “controlled”
the power shifting forces of the Parliament until 2010, when Supreme Court
ruled that the particular provision (of compelling voting along party lines) of
OLIGPAC was unconstitutional. This high court ruling rendered OLIGPAC
ineffective as far as “controlling” the middle and backbenchers was concerned. The
middle and backbenchers of the Parliament have since become the key power
brokering/shifting force of the political landscape of PNG.
Before
the 2010 Supreme Court ruling, from 2002 to 2010, the coalition government
headed by then PM Sir Michael enjoyed nearly a decade of political “stability”
in the history of this nation. This is largely due to OLIGPAC, as well as by
employing other control mechanisms to evade any opposition. This included gagging
of debate in Parliament, and “appeasement” of the middle and backbenchers by
promises of privileges like easy access and timely release of District Services
Improvement Program (DSIP) funds, and other funding streams like the Provincial
Services Improvement Program (PSIP). However, during this period, a dangerous
precedent was set as far as the balance of power between the Executive
Government and the Legislature is concerned, i.e. the former amassed powers by
eating into the latter’s powers in its quest to successfully control the middle
and backbenchers.
Yet,
there would always be disgruntled middle and backbenchers that made this group a
“powder keg”, ready to explode any time when ignited. This became apparent at
the end of the last decade, and apparently after the OLIGPAC was quashed by the
Supreme Court in 2010. In 2011, when the opposition finally had a breakthrough
in having its voice heard in Parliament, it moved for a change in government
when the incumbent PM was in hospital overseas. Almost the entire middle and
backbenchers crossed floor to join the opposition to form a new
government.
How
is the government currently dealing with power shifting forces of Parliament?
The
above is the unfortunate situation of PNG Parliament the current coalition
government inherited after the 2012 National Elections. Given the legislative
void, the Executive Government faces a mammoth challenge in ensuring the middle
and backbenchers are appeased and supportive. The current coalition government
couldn’t use the same tactics as its predecessor mainly because: (i) the
Parliament now has a Speaker who is “resilient”, and has proven that he cannot be easily influenced
to gag Parliamentary debate; (ii) promises of privileges to “appease” the
middle & backbenchers can be ineffective mechanism to contain them because,
like in 2011, they can easily cross floor to form a new government; and (iii)
the coalition government has publicly announced that it will be a transparent
and responsible government. So to ensure
political “stability” or for the coalition government to live out the full five
years term in Parliament, the Executive Government had to further lessen the
powers of the Legislature by amending key legislations including specific
sections of the supreme law of the land, the Constitution. An example of such
legislative change enacted in recent months was to extend the grace period to
30 months (from 18 months).
Recently,
the government has announced that further legislative changes will be made to
ensure political “stability”. The proposed Constitutional amendments will: (i)
require a mover of motion of no-confidence against an incumbent PM/Government give
three advance months (an increase from one week), and ensure signatures of 1/3
(an increase from 1/10) of total MPs nominating an alternative PM; and (ii) reduce
the minimum sitting days of Parliament from 63 to 40 days. The nature of the proposed legislative
changes is such that the demarcation of powers will again be negatively
impacted – more powers will be amassed by the Executive Government at the
expense of the Legislature. Essentially, this will lessen the noise (if any)
the middle and backbenchers could make against the government.
The
opposition has strongly opposed these proposed legislative changes. However, it
is powerless to effect change given it now has less than eight MPs as the
majority of its initial MPs (some of whom were very vocal and critical of the
Executive Government) have left. They have either
joined the government (and become backbenchers) or are in the middle-benches.
All these former opposition MPs claimed on their dates of departure that being
in the opposition would be to miss out on bringing development to their
electorates/provinces. This is a diplomatic way of saying they’d miss out on
privileges enjoyed by those MPs in government or middle-benches, e.g. the
timely and easier access of DSIP and PSIP funds. And those still in opposition
claim their development funds have been withheld.
What
has been happening in the parliament and the actions successive Executive
Governments had taken since the last decade (and proposes to take) are due to
the “fear” the incumbent governments have of being ousted by the (minority)
opposition when the (majority) middle and backbenchers rise against them. How
can this dilemma be addressed? This calls for a bi-partisan approach that could
introduce radical political reforms to be passed by Parliament which would
bring meaningful solution(s). Reforms that would turn political “stability” in
PNG on its head are needed. Such reforms for example, should include the
reduction of the number of political parties. This could be done without
restricting democracy, for example, by lifting the bar on the registration of
political parties, and/or, requiring that they contest a larger minimum number
of seats
*Andrew
Anton Mako is a Research Fellow under the Economic Policy Research program at
the National Research Institute. The views expressed here are his own and do
not necessarily reflect those of NRI or any political party.
